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Networks of Threats: Interconnection, Interaction,
Intermediation
Abstract
The rapidly changing global security environment requires to constantly adapt our
understanding of threats. The findings of this paper confirm that threats interact with each
other on three levels. Security, conflict, war, and strategic studies converge to build a new
qualitative theoretical framework for threat analysis. Shaping the global security
environment, threats communicate on three levels. Firstly, the interconnection of agents
with similar ideological and/or strategic motivations connects threats. Secondly, interaction
exacerbates incidental threats through cooperation, competition, and convergence. Thirdly,
intermediation occurs between antagonistic threats trying to achieve common intermediary
objectives. These networks are driven by agents maximizing their impact and reveals the
autonomization and socialization of threats. Tackling these networks requires a global
approach and the mobilization of collective security.
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Theron: Networks of Threats

Introduction
The global security environment is becoming more complex and
interdependent. Scholars, therefore, must develop new approaches to
understand its dynamics.1 The purpose of this article is to contribute to
this effort. The article’s focus is not on security agents themselves but
on the communicating behavior of the threats they produce. Based on
existing scientific knowledge, the article proposes a theoretical model
that articulates networks of threats on three levels. Although threats
are always produced by agents, they can interconnect (I) and operate
with compatible (II) or even antagonistic threats (III). The proposed
model does not explain the essence of all conflicts; however, it allows
scholars to explore the understudied relations between the various
threats that shape contemporary security environments. The model
cannot predict threats, though it may support threat scenario-building
with new perspectives.

Literature Review
The latest literature has established the existence of relations among
threats. For instance, traditional security studies scholars found that
network-based threats, even if they remain indistinct, are a way to
surpass the agent’s capacities.2 For their part, critical security studies
(CSS) scholars have developed analytical tools such as securitization
and de-securitization, ontological (in)security, weaponization, and the
“co-dependency of agency and context,” all of which induce active
relations among threats.3 Although traditional and critical security
studies remain somewhat self-contained within their conceptual
prisms, both schools of thought acknowledge these relations.
Scholars of conflict studies also investigate the relationships between
terrorist threats, as well as between multiple threats carried out by the
same agent in different conflicts, or between identity-based social
threats and armed conflicts.4 Certain models even test the links
between threats, such as social media propaganda and social unrest, to
predict destabilization.5 In this respect, Giles argues that networking
threats can undermine complex security environments in order to keep
frictions below the threshold of reaction, “in reserve as a casus belli.”6
Coincidentally, in war studies, concepts such as Hoffman’s hybrid
warfare and Galeotti’s political warfare, as well as postulations of “‘new
generation warfare,’ ‘ambiguous warfare,’ ‘full-spectrum warfare’ or
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even ‘non-linear warfare’” have highlighted the intertwined nature of
contemporary threats.7 Indeed, states and violent non-state actors
(VNSA) bring threats above but also below the threshold of violence.
The emergence of a population-centric, group vs group, social, and
transnational type of conflict, described as 5th generation warfare, also
strengthens the link between kinetic and “non-contact warfare.”8 The
distinction between war and peace is now blurry, with threats
interconnecting in what Hoffman calls “the messy middle.”9 Finally, in
strategic studies as well, Freedman acknowledges that an articulation
of “very different sorts of threats” structure security environments
“from below” and “above,” in what Lonsdale calls a “challenge of
complexity.”10
The diverse approaches of these schools of thought limit the general
understanding of the interdependencies among threats because the
study of security induces “different sets of issues and […] different
historical and philosophical contexts.”11 As Boin, Ekengren, and
Rhinard explain, “the more complex a system becomes, the harder it is
for anyone to understand it in its entirety. Tight coupling between a
system’s parts and those of other systems allows for the rapid
proliferation of interactions (and errors) throughout the system.”12
Therefore, it seems essential to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to
understand the mechanisms of relations among threats.

Theoretical approach
This article focuses on how communication among threats structure
security environments. Before addressing the methodology, it seems
necessary to start from a synthesized, cross-domain definition of the
core concepts of threat and network.
A striking gap across the above disciplines is that there is no unified
definition of threat that is common to them all. Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray
define threats as strategic “problems.”13 Bailes describes them as
“challenges” whose “full spectrum” shows “connections between the
different dimensions.”14 Threats, therefore, are hostile phenomena that
structure security environments through their interconnections. In
contrast to Bailes, this article does not, however, distinguish between
threats and risks according to the perception of the peril, but rather
according to its potentiality.15 Risks are, therefore, understood as
potential threats and threats as risks that have developed into active
dangers.
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The definition of networks of threats has also been approached more
directly, in diverse ways. Matthew and McDonald also seek to address
“network-based threat[s]” but confuse “an informal web—a dispersed,
transnational network—of individual behaviors” (a network of agents)
with “malevolent threat networks” (a network of threats).16 Several
other scholars, in contrast, believe that threats form networks by
“communicating.” The etymological polysemy of this verb corresponds
to their three different approaches: Being in mutual relation, being in
communion, and having in common.17
A first group of scientists asserts the ability of threats to interconnect.
For instance, Kunreuther and Heal emphasize that various negative
externalities (possibly considered as threats) design a dangerous
pattern that requires the combination of security mechanisms.18
Keohane and Zeckhauser confirm the existence of a silo effect among
threats. Studying acts of terrorism and citizens’ backlash against
government security policies, they establish that these negative
externalities interconnect.19 Clark and Mitchell explore further the
notion of “channels of communication.”20 This approach affirms the
possibility of communication between the threats and, therefore, the
idea of network, which is also established under group threat theory.
Blumer, in this respect, even proposes an enhanced “symbolic
interaction” where “common perspectives […] emerge through
participation in common communication channels.”21
A second group of scholars describes the ability of threats to interact
more actively. Bier and Azaiez approach networks of threats through
game theory. Rather than concentrating on mathematical models, they
address agents’ behavior from a more open, multidimensional
perspective.22 In this respect, Hausken, Bier, and Zhuang study the
interaction of threats of different nature, such as terrorism, natural
disasters, and other types of hazards.23 Matthew and McDonald use an
analogy from environmental security to understand how threats can
form a network. They argue that by interconnecting, specific threats
can compose a broader “network-based threat.”24 Carmi recognizes the
ability of compatible threats to interact, such as state-related strategies,
VNSA local violence, vacuums in fragile states, and sectarian conflicts.
He advances the idea of the relative autonomy of each of these threats
from its agent.25 Kenney similarly links terrorism, trafficking, and bad
governance.26
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A third group of scientists pushes the concept of networks of threats
even beyond. Benavoli, Ristic, Farina, Oxenham, and Chisci look for a
way to improve threat assessments. Considering the uncertainty of
threats because of the intent and capability of the agent, they establish
an “evidential network” to better comprehend complex security
environments.27 In these environments, Singh, Tu, Allanach, Areta,
Willett, and Pattipati describe threats as designing a “pattern of
transactions.”28 In the same vein, Blalock considers that threats induce
action-reaction chains of reciprocal behaviors among rivals.29 Various
case studies confirm that even antagonistic agents can constitute
networks by communicating tacitly (Ebner; Lee and Knott) or explicitly
(Koch; Chermak, Freilich, and Simone).30
This distribution outlines challenges, theses, and research questions
according to three levels:
I. While bonding, agents interconnect the threats they produce.
The related challenge is to differentiate clearly between agents and
threats. Agents are individual or group actors trying to realize specific
projects; threats are hostile phenomena produced by them. While no
threat exists truly independently of an agent, agents are rarely (if ever)
in full control of the threats they induce, deeply influenced by material
variables as well as third-party agents. Agents emit and adjust threats
but are unable to keep full control over them nor their agencies,
inducing therefore a “consubstantiality of security and insecurity.” 31
Thus, it is crucial to distinguish between the agent and the threat.
Nevertheless, differentiating agents from threats does not imply
independence. Threats are both inseparably linked to their agents and
significantly autonomous from them. Accordingly, this article considers
the thesis of the autonomy of threats and investigates the nature of the
conductors that push agents to interconnect their threats (Research
Question 1).
II. Compatible threats can actively interact. The inherent challenge
here relates to how threats, which are a priori similar, can proceed to
these interactions. The difference between the accumulation of threats
and the communication among threats must therefore be addressed. A
simple juxtaposition is different from joint operability. Essentially, the
accumulation of threats is a necessary precondition for their
communication. The two processes are therefore not in opposition.
Moreover, agents exchange information with coterminous agents more
or less directly and permanently. These exchanges may occur through
48
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direct contact, social media, propaganda outlets, or even simply
traditional media coverage of their actions. Threats massively socialize
through today’s global information and communication landscape. This
socialization thesis, therefore, stems from the fact that any type of
informational contact between agents, however loose and informal, is a
potential interaction channel for threats. This study thus tries to
understand the different mechanisms of these interactions (Research
Question 2).
III. In a transactional pattern, threats can in theory communicate
even if their agents are in opposition to each other. From this
perspective, the challenge lies in recognizing that threats are not
necessarily aligned with their agents and can even operate against their
agents’ declared projects. Due to the autonomy thesis, threats might
proceed both in the presence or the absence of their agents’ direct
alignment. In addition, from the perspective of the socialization thesis,
they operate their own communication processes. If it is an apparent
paradox that opposite agents produce communicating threats, but they
might actually need to reach common intermediary objectives to realize
their own projects. Threats might therefore objectively intermediate
without the official alignment of their antagonistic agents. In this
respect, Schelling emphasizes the need to consider explicit but also
tacit types of cooperation.32 This paradox thesis could explain how
declared enemies can constitute a common threat. This article
examines consequently also how threats operate these intermediations
(Research Question 3).
The three research questions above are interdependent and
consequently require a shared methodology. Contextual-effects
modeling in threat analysis was an option; however, this method
concentrates only on one type of threat—the power threat—based on
the political domination of an ethnic group on others.33 The threat
curve method offers insight into multi-threat systems but does not
focus on communication processes.34 Quantitative data mining and
analysis could also be an option, but this method would require a
probabilistic inductive approach.35 Instead, this article uses Kapitan’s
abduction.36 Using data from case studies representing very diverse
security environments can indeed induce appropriate answers to the
three research questions.37 This qualitative method mobilizes a
selection of cases from the past 100 years. Older cases may contain
pertinent elements but are too dependent on their specific historical
contexts, such as the international order, sociopolitical habitus, or the
49
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status of technological developments at the time. This article does not
seek to exhaustively consider all relevant examples; rather, it selects
pertinent case studies that strengthen the understanding of how threats
communicate at the three levels of networks.

First level: Interconnection
An analysis of security linkages necessarily starts by examining the ties
between agents. Both ideology and strategy are in this regard potential
conductors. Ideology may unite agents affiliated with the same system
of ideas, whereas strategy may push agents toward a common agenda.
These conductors are the foundations of two different interconnecting
mechanisms.
Ideology
Ideology may appear to be the most natural conductor. There are many
examples of ideology acting as a conductor, including Socialist
internationalism, European nationalism, and pro-Iranian Shia
alignment.38 Ideology acted as a conductor, for instance, in 2006 in
Sudan. The Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of West Sudan arose from
the interconnection between the Justice and Equality Movement and
the Sudan Liberation Movement. A compatible belief in Darfuri
irredentism led the two groups to unite against Khartoum.39
Ideology can also connect distant groups belonging to very different
security environments. For example, Salafi jihadi groups sharing a
similar belief are active in various theaters around the world, including
Mindanao in the southern Philippines, Dagestan in the northern
Caucasus, and Cabo Delgado in southeastern Africa. A global, holistic,
teleological, and eschatological ideology unites these groups. They
simply adapt it to their particular security contexts, regularly
capitalizing on preexisting conflicts.40
These examples support the potential of ideology to act as a threat
conductor. However, it is not necessarily true that closer ideological
alignment leads to a greater attraction. A more nuanced understanding
must consider the relevant context. For example, nationalist
movements can interconnect with one another but are not always eager
to. The nationalist Četnici and Ustaši movements that reappeared in
Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s were actively antagonistic toward each
other. Yet the movements were similarly constructed, being
50
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combinations of ethnical and religious belonging with a partitive,
glorifying historiography. Nationalist agents could however arguably be
considered as essentially incompatible, based on a self-declared
superiority.
However, despite the conflict of World War II, socialist
internationalism managed to align the regimes of Jaruzelski in Poland
and Honecker in German Democratic Republic (DDR) along the lines
of Soviet orthodoxy, under the Warsaw Pact. However, even in this
example, the agents’ divergences can lead to a limitation of the
conduction effect. Ideological competition between the USSR and the
People’s Republic of China provoked indeed the Sino-Vietnamese war,
as well as the war between the so-called Democratic Kampuchea and
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. A shared ideological foundation can
therefore lead agents to interconnect their threats, but it can also lead
them to compete for ideological leadership.
As Walt noted at the end of the Cold War,
“the observed association probably exaggerates the true impact
of ideology. In particular, the extent of ideological agreement
between the superpowers and their allies is fairly limited, and
the correlation between ideology and alignment may be partly
spurious.”41
Thus, ideological interconnection is not automatic. Ideology may lead
agents to interconnect but can also turn natural allies into enemies. It is
a natural, but uncertain, conductor that is dependent on strategy.
Strategy
As Balzacq, Dombrowski, and Reich note, irrespective of the ideology,
strategic cooperation aggregates the interests of middle and global
powers, such as Syria and Russia or North Korea and China.42 These
links are particularly important in troubled regions, as agents face (or
perceive) existential threats. Edström and Westberg reach a similar
conclusion in their analysis of Regional Security Complexes (RSCs).43
Such cooperation led countries and VNSA from various backgrounds to
take part in Operation Inherent Resolve, which targeted the Islamic
State. Thus, whatever the ideology, strategy can push agents to
interconnect their threats against a common enemy.
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Exploring the behavior of VNSA, Christia considers that identifying
common strategic objectives is critical to “(1) win[ning] the war and (2)
maximiz[ing] the group’s share of postwar political control.” She
confirms Walt’s earlier assessment, saying that “identity – be it racially,
linguistically, religiously, or ideologically defined – appears to have no
sustained causal role in the formation of alliances.”44 Strategy is,
therefore, a more efficient conductor than ideology.
In practice, the use of strategy as a conductor can even influence
ideology. If a state allies with a VNSA that uses terrorist methods, the
state will try to recontextualize those methods ideologically as
resistance, rather than terrorism. For example, Iran is at the center of a
VNSA network (with Hezbollah and Hashd al-Shaabi), forged around
the concept of al-muqawama, which literally means “resistance”.45
Socialist movements such as the Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’
Liberation Army (TİKKO) and the Kurdish People’s Defense Forces
(HPG), armed branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), have
significant ideological differences. They can also insist more on their
convergences when interconnecting their threats against the Turkish
forces.
Agents interconnect their threats through ideology or strategy, and
constitute in this way the first-level network. This adjunction initiates
the autonomization of threats, as, interconnected, they possibly can
dissociate from the agents, and allows for more integrative levels of
networking.

Second level: Interaction
The interconnection discussed in the previous section encourages
threats to interact. Indeed, Bailes emphasizes the importance of their
co-dependency in shaping security environments.46 Several case
studies confirm this phenomenon.
Contemporary global jihadism developed out, for example, of the
convergence of characters (most notoriously, Abdallah Azzam, Osama
Bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri). They interconnected by both
ideology and strategy.47 The threat posed by al-Qaida in its early years
was context-specific, linked to the war against the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan. It played however a central role in globalizing ultimately
the jihadi threat, using the international network of mujahideen. As the
threat originally produced by al-Qaida grew in notoriety between 2001
52
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(9/11) and 2014 (emergence of the Islamic state), the group
progressively lost its control over the broader movement. Many agents
interconnected to the shared ideology/strategy. They inflated the threat
but also emancipated it from its originating agent by producing their
own parallel threats. Some focused on local theaters (Boko haram) or
diverged on the strategy (Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn).
Thus, the threat of jihadism diversified, being still produced by alQaida, but also by numerous other agents.
Threats can therefore dissociate from their agents when they interact in
a new, broader threat. This confirms the autonomy thesis initiated by
the first-level network. Moreover, the evolution of each specific threat
shifts the direction of this broad threat. Specific threats driving
together the broader threat induces therefore that interaction backs the
socialization thesis. Kelshall considers the autonomy and socialization
of broad threats through the lens of 5th generation warfare and the rise
of a new kind of VNSA: violent transnational social movements
(VTSM).48 Specific threats often interact to induce a broad threat
without any leadership. Research examining social control, reflexive
control, and controlled chaos theories also confirms that threats
socialize.49 This phenomenon creates a second-level network of threats,
animated by three types of interacting mechanisms.
Cooperation
According to the U.S. Senate, “white supremacists and other far-rightwing extremists are the most significant domestic terrorism threat
facing the United States.”50 The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of
2019 established (Sec.2.5) how specific threats interact through the
socialization of their agents, but also create a broader autonomous
threat. Within the broad threat of American far-right extremism, each
movement is fairly independent. The Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi groups,
the Three Percenters, the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and the
Boogaloo Bois do not share the same ideology, nor do they share an
integrated strategy. Further, unaffiliated far-right individual radicals
have even more disparate motivations. Each group and potentially each
individual of this galaxy represents a specific threat. The agents
interconnect their threats through incidental ideologies and analogous
strategies (first-level network). Their specific threats interact and
contribute to the broader threat, even where each agent’s actions are
only known by the others rather than agreed upon (second-level
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network). This interaction stimulates each agent’s specific threats and
strengthens the broad threat.
The targets of specific threats can also differ from the target of the
broad threat, further supporting the idea of the broad threat’s
autonomy. Indeed, Catalan, Flemish, and Padanian secessionisms are
specific threats facing Spain, Belgium, and Italy, respectively. However,
secessionist agents are not only in contact with one another (first-level
network) but also actively cooperate (second-level network).51 This
creates a broad threat against a different target: the European Union
(EU). The specific threats in question do not target the EU, as the
regional organization could manage crises in individual member states.
However, the broad threat the induce by their interaction could lead to
the Balkanization of the continent, and, eventually, the collapse of the
EU’s political architecture.
Competition
The examples of global jihadism and the US far right show that the
attraction between the related agents comes from a more or less
cohesive match of ideology and strategy. However, specific threats can
interact not only when agents cooperate but also when they compete
while inducing a common broad threat. Such divergences among close
agents may occur because of ideological self-righteousness or an
appetite for strategic leadership. Even if two actors compete, their
threats can interact and take part in the same broad threat. This is
another element supporting the autonomy thesis.
The fierce competition between al-Qaida and the Islamic State in the
Sahel is a clear example of this. Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen
(JNIM) and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) are in
strategic competition with each other. The very creation of JNIM
resulted from al-Qaida’s desire to prevent the Islamic State from
expanding in the Sahel-Sahara region. Their specific threats, despite
being turned toward each other (inter-jihadi fights), also interact by
expanding the broad threat of Salafi jihadism in the region.52 The
competition between the two agents does not reduce the threat level;
rather, it both invigorates their specific threats and reinforces the
broad threat.
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Convergence
Regardless of whether agents cooperate or compete, they may
eventually fuse into a single entity, converting their multiple threats
into a single one. This convergence can occur through fusion,
allegiance, or absorption, as evidenced by the VNSAs that operated in
Syria during the 2010s. The agents may merge to achieve greater
efficiency, as when Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki and Ahrar al-Cham
fused to form Jabhat Tahrir Souriya. An agent in an inferior position
may also pledge its allegiance to an agent in a superior position, as did
Tanzim Hurras al-Din with al-Qaida and Ansar Beit al-Maqdis with the
Islamic State. A stronger agent may finally support the integration of
weaker agents into a particular structure, as occurred when Firqat alSultan Murad joined Jaish al-Watani al-Suri as a proxy of Turkish
Armed Forces. All the agents mentioned above attempted to reverse the
gradual fragmentation of VNSA in Syria that led from “one insurgency
to many.”53 Their specific threats interacted and turned into a single
one.
When a broad threat has a unifying project, the specific threats
composing it may progressively lose their specificity and merge. The
same types of interaction can be identified in other conflict situations,
in Pakistan (Deobandi groups), Northern Mali (Tuareg groups),
Bosnia-Herzegovina (groups from Republika Srpska) or Eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo (groups in Kivu).
The different types of interaction correspond to threats that are linked
by more or less aligned agents. They may cooperate or compete, but
they share in a certain measure ideology and strategy. However, strictly
oppositional threats can also partake in a common threat.

Third level: Intermediation
As Schelling explains, threats might interact explicitly but also tacitly,
enabling antagonistic agents to collaborate more or less openly.
Studying mobs, he underlines “a potent force not only in pure
coordination but in the mixed situation that includes conflict.” 54 Thus,
agents may be ideologically and strategically opposed but may
contribute, nevertheless, to an overruling threat. The mechanism of
this third-level network of threats underlines the role of an
intermediating element.
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Mechanism
Several case studies support the existence of overruling threats. For
example, Israel and Saudi Arabia (KSA) have set aside their ideological
and strategic differences to join forces against Iran. For Iran, this poses
a clear overruling threat composed of two different enemies with
potentially devastating consequences. Israel might, for instance, use
KSA territory to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Another example of
such a situation exists in Syria. Having conflicting objectives for their
country’s future, some post-Free Syrian Army Arab katibas and
Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) fought. However, others
united, in the framework of the Syrian Democratic Forces, to oppose
the Islamic State. The same mechanism has also emerged between the
Iranian Islamic Republic, which supports a Twelver Shia theological
regime, and the Taliban, which believes the quite different Deobandi
fundamentalism, as well as, to a certain degree, al-Qaida, supporter of
global Salafi jihadism.55 The agents’ common enemy is the United
States, major architect of their international security environments. All
these specific threats intermediate to create an overruling threat,
despite the ideological and strategic antagonisms of their agents.
The same mechanism can also apply to antagonistic broad threats, as in
the intermediation between Salafi jihadism and European far-right
against democratic states. The objective of these two broad threats is to
topple democratic states and install alternative autocratic regimes.
However, neither is separately powerful enough to achieve this. Thus,
they unite to reach a temporary common objective: security instability.
For both movements, indeed, the transition from the present situation
(a stable order assured by a democratic state) to their goals (a new
political order, either Salafi or nationalist autocracy) requires a
transition through a shared intermediary state (the collapse of the
security environment). This mechanism could also apply to movements
with rival nationalist and religious projects, such as in Sudan (AlNimeiry and Al-Bashir regimes vs Al-Mahdi’s Hizb al-Umma al-Qawmi
and Al-Turabi’s al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Qawmiyah), in Pakistan
(praetorian apparatus vs Deobandi Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi or Ahl-e Hadith Lashkar-e-Taiba) as well as in
Myanmar (military junta vs Buddhist monks).
As illustrated by these examples, agents can simultaneously be enemies
and ally to reach intermediary objectives. Their threats operate
simultaneously with and against each other. The overruling threat
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appears therefore as superior to the antagonistic specific threats,
thanks to an intermediating element.
Intermediating Element
The Salafi jihadi-far right configuration discussed in the previous
section illustrates the role of anti-democratic dogma as the junction
point, or intermediating element, between the movements. Agents do
not need to meet to establish such an element, nor do they have to
formally agree to intermediate their threats. Given that such agents are
officially enemies, this is often unlikely to occur. Rather, the
intermediating element exists de facto.
A key characteristic of the intermediating element is that it is both the
meeting point and the conflicting point between the agents.56 For
example, the Syrian regime repressed the democratic movement that it
associated with terrorism, while using jihadism to radicalize the
revolution.57 The Islamic State grew on this situation of repressive
chaos and also repressed democrats.58 Both the Syrian regime and the
Islamic State disqualified democratic movements by associating it to
the other, then repressed it. In doing so, they intermediated their
threats to expel all moderate forces and avoid the creation of a new,
Western-backed security environment in the country.
A similar situation occurred in Iraq. Between 2004 and 2008, Salafi
jihadi and Shia Sadrist movements fought to control the country. Their
intermediating element was to expel the US, which was also seeking to
create a new security environment in the country. Both radical
movements viewed the US as potentially favoring the other side. The
overruling threat finally succeeded in expelling the US. The next phase
of violence occurred between their heirs, the Islamic State and Hashd
al-Shaabi, from 2014 onwards.59
The last example is the recurrent opposition between far-left and farright threats, which also intermediate an overruling threat against
democratic regimes. In Europe, violent left-wing movements view
democracy as an economically liberal, bourgeois, and anti-Muslim
system dominated by the reactionary right. Far-right violent groups see
democracy as a loose and overly liberal system of governance
contaminated by leftist social disorder and tolerance for Islamists. Both
movements denigrate therefore a common enemy, liberal democracy,
associating it with the opposing camp. Their intermediating element is
57
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to tackle down representative democracy to install new political
regimes according to their own views. This intermediation can be either
tacit or even quite explicit, as, for instance, in the contexts of antiausterity protests in Greece, Gilets Jaunes demonstrations in France,
and anti-vax movements.

Conclusion
Based on existing knowledge, this article addressed the way threats
shape security environments by communicating through networks. The
model developed through the case studies offers theoretical insights
and policy teachings. It also raises novel issues to be investigated.
Validity of the model
The case studies examined in this article included various agents (far
left, far right, Sunni jihadism, Shia jihadism, secessionism) that evolve
in different regional security environments (USA, Western Europe,
Eastern Europe, Balkans, Sahel, Middle East, Eastern Africa, South
Asia). This investigation confirms the results of previous studies
concerning the existence of an architecture of networks of threats
organized into three levels. The choice of a qualitative inferential
methodology produced the following results with respect to the three
research questions.
I.

II.

III.

Agents do interconnect their threats, motivated more by
strategy than ideology as conductors. Individuals and groups
try to leverage the power of their specific threats and, in
doing so, initiate the autonomization of the threats.
Threats initiated by aligned agents interact through several
mechanisms that confirm their autonomy. By socializing,
they shape a broad threat.
An intermediating element allows threats carried by
antagonistic agents to paradoxically align. Threats reach
momentarily for a common intermediary objective while
producing an overruling threat against a common enemy.

The first level appears to be mandatory for the second and the third one
to be implemented. In other words, interconnection is a prerequisite
for interaction and intermediation to appear. This three-tiered
structure designs a simple road map.
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Figure 1. Networks of threats’ road map
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Theoretical contributions
The model proposed in this article makes several contributions to
security studies. Networks of threats reveal structuring abilities, induce
leverage effects, produce risks, and expose a security scale. Primarily,
by networking, threats appear to shape security environments by being
both “causes and patterns of crises.”60 Networks of threats can
substantially amplify the causes of security crises. As threats design the
patterns of security environments, networks logically increase their
complexity. By interconnecting with each other, specific threats
determine the environment’s general structure; by interacting and
intermediating, broad and overruling threats create a threatening
superstructure. In this respect, security environments can be
understood as frames structured by networks of threats that apply to a
given geographical area, institutional entity, or social group.
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Moreover, the examined cases show that networking induces in agents
a capacity to leverage that maximizes their negative externality in the
security environment they evolve in. It is a well-known fact that, by
collaborating, agents obtain a variety of material benefits, such as
finances, intelligence gathering, rear bases, multiplied firepower, or
territorial protection. Thanks to their networking threats, agents also
achieve stronger propagandist narrative, reach new audiences, the
ability to attack superior agents, the dilution of responsibility, political
safety, or international support. Agents, therefore, always have an
interest in letting their threats network with others at all levels.
However, networks of threats also come with risks for the agent
themselves. At the lower level, agents might suffer from an “open door”
policy that leads to the blurring of identities and capabilities being
siphoned off; agents might also be infiltrated by undercover enemies.
At higher levels, they might lose their leadership (interaction) or
benefit enemies (intermediation). Even so, due to the leverage effect,
networks of threats reinforce the risk for security environments. The
multiplication of possibilities that results from the network diversifies
the types and probability of hostile actions. This is especially the case at
the first level, as specific threats are those of the most direct and
imminent kind. The difficulty in identifying the threats’ agency at the
second and third levels amplifies the risk. The second level assembles
incidental specific threats, implementing a broad threat that surpasses
the sum of its parts. Here, therefore, the risk is also indirect but
structural. At the third level, as the network associates antagonistic
threats, the risk impacts security environments more globally. The risk
is, once again, also indirect, but this time it is global.
Finally, networks of threats deploy on multiple scales. At the first level,
specific threats are more immediate, sharper, operating on a smaller
security scale. This does not mean that the impact would not be
significant (as 9/11 demonstrated), but that the threat can transform
directly into hostile action. The second level integrates specific threats
but also pertain to a more strategic security scale through the broad
threat. As multiple strategies shape the overruling threat, the third level
deploys, consequently, at a bigger security scale.
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Figure 2. Networking outcomes
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Policy contributions
Besides contributing to theory, this study can also support security
policymaking. The three-tiered model is not a universal tool; however,
it can decipher various complex security environments. Contemporary
security environments are intricate and rapidly evolving. New tools
must be able to adapt and allow a suitable threat assessment.
In this respect, the model suggests that it is fruitless to fight
contemporary threats without understanding their mechanisms of
communication. Misinterpreting networks of threats increases the
possibility of drifting securitization processes. Addressing one threat
separately might end up worsening the whole security environment.
Today, threats are uncertain in their very definition. They are also
sometimes indistinct, and almost always intertwined. The model
presented in this article might therefore add a new tool for
practitioners who wish to better comprehend how security
environments are designed. To this end, they might follow the model’s
road map:
1)

Draw the landscape of specific threats and their active or
potential interconnections, as the first network level is
necessary for the second and the third one to come into being.
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2)

3)

Review the interacting dynamics among aligned agents
through advanced intelligence gathering and analysis, and
enhance the strategic understanding of the broad threat.
Evaluate the interests, capacities and opportunities of rival
agents to intermediate, explicitly or tacitly, via an overruling
threat.

It is important to note that threats change depending on agents’
strategies and material conditions. The networks can therefore quickly
transform. It is thus essential for analysts and policymakers to
permanently reexamine the networks.
In this respect, the diverse cases studied in this article suggest
contextual factors that have positive and negative impacts on networks.
These factors can favor or limit the ability of threats to constitute
networks. Therefore, they represent ways to evaluate and prevent the
networks’ effects on its security environment.
Figure 3. Networking Factors
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Negative
factors
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From a policy perspective, the general lesson that can be drawn from
this article is that threats almost always communicate, even if
indirectly. This implies that security policies have to be global and
consider the security environment in its entirety, paying attention not
only to threats as a whole but also to the complexity of their agency.
The paper also shows that security policies cannot avoid external
cooperation, especially when addressing networks at the higher levels.
Collective security, particularly on a regional basis, appears to be
crucial in tackling networks of threats that expand beyond local or
national borders.
Future research
Inevitably, this article has several limitations that require further
research. Regarding the first level, motivations for interconnection
might vary with certain ideologies. Self-sufficiency is part of some
ideologies (socialist autonomism or irredentist localism, for instance).
Although ideology is a relative conductor, it might play a substantial
role in conditioning threats’ interconnection. Furthermore, first-level
networking might depend on relatively isolating strategies. Some
agents might proceed intentionally as limitations to external linkages,
such as indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation (Andaman, Brazil,
New Guinea). Others might proceed as protective (North Korea, Khmer
Rouge) or forced (Kachin Independence Organization, United
Liberation Movement for West Papua) limitations to networks.
Another interesting path is failing interconnection when an agent is
ostracized (as, for instance, the Islamic State’s position on Abubakar
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Shekau’s Boko Haram, and to a lesser extent on the Islamic State in the
Greater Sahara). Finally, the very transition from interconnection to
interaction and intermediation could also be the object of a separate
study.
Concerning the second level, the interaction among threats evolves
rapidly when the agents’ capacities change. The evolution of democratic
and jihadi irregular forces in Syria reveals that the power balance of
these two competitive broad threats was quickly reversed. Another
issue is the ambiguity or duplicity of the agents when their threats
interact. They might disguise their will, making it difficult to assess the
proper type of interaction. Lastly, broad threats established by a
competitive interaction (second level) might also turn into an
overruling threat (third level). Indeed, aligned agents can sever their
ties in case of important strategic divergences (the split between the
Irish independentist movements; the conflict between the
governmental and opposition branches of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement; or the triangulation between the People’s
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola, and the Front for the Liberation of the
Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda). If aligned agents
become antagonists, their network can continue to operate as an
intermediation rather than an interaction. This phenomenon could also
be explored further.
Regarding the third level, the main limitation is how to discern tacit
intermediation. As overruling threats might operate without the agents
being in visible collaboration, this phenomenon has to be assessed
through analysis rather than factual proof. This requires an excellent
knowledge of sometimes very different agents, which specialists rarely
have. Contemporary security environments offer many opportunities
for unexpected third-level networks of threats to occur anywhere
(Chechen Kadyrovtsy in Aleppo, Islamic State in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Syrian National Army in Nagorno Karabakh, or the
Wagner Group in the Central African Republic).
Finally, on a more general perspective, threats are often considered per
se, as stated by agents. The problem of threats depending on
subjectivity should therefore be addressed. Sometimes in connection
with this issue but also more largely, processes of threat assessment
regularly fail to properly address a given security environment, with
disastrous consequences. Indeed, to stay under the threshold of
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reaction, hostile agents often fool their enemies by keeping their
threats intentionally low while leveraging them through multiple
networks.
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